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No one would save for retirement or slave away at clearing a field for herself, if she 
knew for certain that she would not live to enjoy the fruits of the labor. The point of 
many of our projects hangs on the assumption of our continued existence. 
Extending this commonsensical thought, Samuel Scheffler (2013) argues for the 
provocative thesis that the value of many of our activities depends on humanity in 
general surviving into the future beyond our own lives – in short, on our having 
what he calls a secular afterlife. We would be rightly demoralized if we knew that 
history would end after us.  
But how long, and what kind, must our afterlife be for us to flourish? In his 
critical response, Mark Johnston (2014) argues that an afterlife that matters must 
itself be flourishing, which results in a kind of Ponzi scheme: the value of every life 
in history hangs on the infinite continuation of humanity. Otherwise the whole 
structure will collapse when we reach the last generation, which cannot flourish 
without an afterlife of its own.  
In this note, I will develop an independently plausible version of afterlifism 
that avoids this objection. While the full significance of many of our activities tacitly 
presupposes a realistic prospect of making a difference to future lives, future 
flourishing is neither necessary nor sufficient for our own flourishing. 
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For and Against Afterlifism 
Scheffler (2013) asks what it would mean psychologically and normatively if we were 
to discover that all of humanity will be extinguished soon after our own eventual 
death, whether by a cosmic accident or global infertility. He argues that such 
knowledge would and should deeply affect our decisions and actions. We would have 
less reason to do many kinds of research, engage in political or environmental 
activism, educate others, or sacrifice for art, for example – perhaps so little reason 
that the activities would become pointless. This is particularly clear in the case of 
projects whose ultimate success depends on what happens in the future, perhaps 
because it takes generations to achieve the goal, or projects whose point it is to 
benefit people for a long time. But part of our reason for undertaking many other 
activities derives from participating in and extending a continuing social tradition, 
and other activities, like reading fiction or appreciating art, are arguably as 
rewarding as they are only in the context of ongoing human history. So we would be 
justifiably demoralized by the prospect of human extinction – even more so than by 
the prospect of our own death. Scheffler concludes (in part) that we need future 
generations to exist in order to flourish ourselves, in order for our lives to have 
significant purpose and value. 
The way I’ve characterized Scheffler’s argument suggests a view that can be 
captured as follows:  
Brute Afterlifism 
Many activities that give value to our lives are pointless (or at least less 
worthy of emotional investment), unless there exist future generations of 
human beings, so we need future generations to exist in order to flourish. 
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The little that Scheffler explicitly says is in this vein. In introducing the notion, he 
says that “in this rather nonstandard sense, I take it for granted that there is an 
afterlife: that others will continue to live after I have died” (2013, 15). 
Johnston’s critique begins with the observation that while it is plausible that 
many of our commitments and plans do presuppose a continuing human future, 
simple survival of humanity in any condition whatsoever is not sufficient for us to 
avoid being justifiably demoralized by knowledge of what is to come. As he puts it,  
If the future of humanity just came down to Mafia-like families battling it out 
on a galactic scale, or to our being fully pacified fodder for the hungry aliens, 
or to our universal participation in “reality” shows to the exclusion of 
anything else—in other words, if the human future did not contain some 
value-laden lives—then it would not provide the larger horizon of sustaining 
value that makes many of our present small efforts matter. (Johnston 2014) 
 
Johnston maintains that insofar as the value of our activities hangs on future 
generations, the non-demoralizing scenarios of human survival are those in which 
future lives are value-laden in just the same way as ours. So the most defensible 
version of afterlifism is something like the following:  
Recursive Afterlifism 
Many activities that give value to our lives are pointless, unless there 
are flourishing future generations of human beings, so we need flourishing 
future generations to exist in order to flourish. 
However, Recursive Afterlifism (RA) leads to a very pessimistic conclusion, unless 
there is an infinite chain of flourishing human generations. After all, if the afterlife is 
finite, we will eventually reach a generation that has no afterlife, and by RA, such a 
generation cannot flourish. Since the flourishing of the immediately preceding 
 4 
generation hangs on a flourishing afterlife, it cannot flourish either. The same is true 
of the preceding generation, and the one before, and so on to the beginning of time.  
So if everyone’s flourishing hangs on a flourishing future, no one can flourish. 
But fortunately, Johnston believes, we can flourish in a finite world, so Recursive 
Afterlifism is false. Regardless of what happens in the future, “there is simple human 
joy, the joy that comes from eating, drinking, sensing, moving one’s body, engaging 
one’s intellect, conversing” (2014). We can also be good to each other right now, and 
grateful for what we have already received. Although we are deprived of genuine 
goods without a flourishing future for humanity, self-standing goods that can be 
realized in the present are enough to make our lives worthwhile.  
But will this really do? Parts of Johnston’s alternative sound like what Tolstoy 
called the Epicurean response to grasping the finitude of humanity. It consists in 
“enjoying for the present the blessings that we do have … it lies in licking the honey 
as best we can” (Tolstoy 1884/1983, 49–50). While there is a lot to be said for living 
in the present, there seems to be something shallow and even desperate in foregoing 
those ordinary sources of significance that do seem to hang on a continuing human 
history. But can we find a form of afterlifism that doesn’t lead to pessimism when 
combined with finitude? 
 
How to Cope with a Finite Afterlife 
The issue that Johnston rightly raises for Scheffler concerns the nature of a 
meaning-endowing afterlife. Not just any kind of future existence will do. But, I will 
argue, neither is infinite chain of flourishing generations necessary, nor even 
sufficient. To make the case, I will first introduce the notion of a meaning horizon.  
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Suppose, with Scheffler, that a large part of the point of participating in 
cancer research, for example, is that one thus contributes to improving the lives of 
many people over time. But how many people and for how long? It is natural to 
think that while there is some point in the activity if there is just one generation of 
people who get to benefit from it, it makes more sense to make the effort if there are 
more generations to come, as long as those generations stand in the right relation to 
present activity (see below). We want our contributions to have enduring value, so 
that we don’t vanish without a trace. But at some point, I maintain, it will not matter 
whether there’s n or n+1 generations left. (What n amounts to will depend on the 
activity in question.)  
Let us call the span of future generations up to the point at which the 
existence of further generations no longer affects the significance of present activity 
the meaning horizon of an activity. By definition, what happens beyond the 
meaning horizon doesn’t affect the value of the activity. Suppose that there’s just as 
much point in cancer research if there’s a 100 or a 101 future generations to be 
benefited by it. If so, were the world to end a 101 generations after the cure, it makes 
no difference to the value of that activity. If the world ends beyond the meaning 
horizon of everything we do (our total meaning horizon), it’s all the same from the 
perspective of our self-interest. Plausibly, our meaning horizons are finite: it would 
not affect my motivation and emotional commitment to the things I do if I were to 
discover that humanity will end in, say, 3000 years. So what? 
The notion of a meaning horizon by itself doesn’t solve the recursion 
problem. As long as the point of my activities depends on the flourishing of future 
generations within my meaning horizon, the regress still looms. As long as the last 
generation has a meaning horizon beyond itself (as any form of afterlifism holds), it 
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cannot flourish. Consequently, the preceding generation cannot flourish either, and 
so on. 
Fortunately, it is not the flourishing of future generations that is required for 
the significance of our future-directed activities. What is needed is that they make a 
difference beyond our personal existence. The best form of afterlifism is something 
like the following: 
Difference-Making Afterlifism 
Many activities that give value to our lives have less point if there is no 
realistic prospect of their making a positive difference for future generations 
within their meaning horizon, so we need a realistic prospect of the life of 
future generations within our meaning horizon to be influenced by ours in 
order to flourish. 
A few clarifications. First, I say we need a realistic prospect of making a difference: 
cancer research has a point even if it turns out to make no difference in the end, as 
long as it might very well do so – it makes a difference in most nearby possible 
worlds, say. Second, making a positive difference means different things for 
different activities. Some things are supposed to benefit future generations, some to 
be there to be potentially appreciated, some to keep the tradition going in some form 
into the future. Third, I don’t mean the thesis to be individualistic. It’s not 
necessarily my doing something that needs to have a realistic prospect of making a 
difference, but ours collectively. It may be enough that I participate in a practice, 
such as making music, that has a future as well as a present. Even if my individual 
contribution will be forgotten, I will have helped pass the torch. Finally, while I 
acknowledge that the claim needs to be supported by argument, I must leave it open 
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here just why making an enduring positive difference matters for the value of our 
lives – perhaps it has to do with the significance of transcending the temporal limits 
of an individual life, as Robert Nozick (1981, 594 ff.) suggests, or with making the 
story of our lives a more successful one, as I argue elsewhere (Kauppinen 
forthcoming). 
Difference-Making Afterlifism agrees with Johnston that a future of nothing 
but endless power struggle between gangster clans or alien enslavement is justifiably 
demoralizing. But that’s not because those generations fail to flourish, but because, 
say, they are guaranteed to fail to be benefited by our sacrifices or continue the 
traditions we have maintained. Our future-directed efforts are altogether futile (and 
robustly such). That sucks for us. Simple survival of humanity won’t do: the kind of 
future that humanity has must somehow non-accidentally hang on what we do, or 
for there to at least be a realistic chance of that. 
 This line of thought is further buttressed by considering what I’ll call a Reset 
Event: a global catastrophe that ends history as we know it, while nevertheless 
preserving the continuity of the species. Suppose that through a natural catastrophe, 
all traces of human activity are permanently destroyed, and all human beings apart 
from a small number of babies perish. Those babies are by chance reared by friendly 
animals (or aliens), and survive to form new human communities with no link to the 
past. They may eventually develop something akin to science and art, but these 
analogues have no connection to our history and endeavors. These strangers may 
even flourish, while we will have been totally erased – nothing anyone has ever done 
(apart from some baby-making) makes a difference to the lives or the existence of 
the post-Reset generations. I maintain that we would be just about as justifiably 
demoralized by the prospect of a Reset Event as by a doomsday scenario. (Some 
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random genes will have to survive, which may provide some consolation.) This 
supports the claim that it’s making a difference that matters, while mere survival or 
mere flourishing is not sufficient. 
Importantly, Difference-Making Afterlifism isn’t a Ponzi scheme. Consider 
the last generation. They had better have a carpe diem attitude: it makes little sense 
for them to do many of the things that orient our lives. Maybe their lives are bound 
to be quite meaningless, focused as they are on short-term pleasures and immediate 
relationships. Their lives are not necessarily entirely devoid of value – after all, they 
can make a difference to the lives of their contemporaries, and enjoy the gifts of the 
present – but they cannot flourish as we can at our best. 
What about the second-to-last generation? They do have an afterlife, 
although a brief one. Can they flourish? According to Difference-Making Afterlifism, 
the answer is a qualified yes. Even if their descendants won’t exactly flourish, they 
can be benefited by their actions, or continue their traditions. The second-to-last 
generation does have a realistic prospect of making a difference of the right sort in 
the short long run, so research or activism or contributing to a tradition, or anything 
else undertaken in the service or in the context of these ends, still makes sense to 
some extent. They can lead somewhat flourishing lives, and their predecessors with 
a longer afterlife even more so. The meaning horizon of many earlier generations 
will have been exhausted, so the eventual end of humanity does not in any way 
diminish the value of their efforts. There is thus no regress that would doom anyone 
who ever lived. Hence, even if the value of our lives is to a significant degree hostage 
to the future, our collective finitude doesn’t make it all insignificant – unless, 
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perhaps, we happen to be the very last generation, in which case we’re probably best 
off just licking the honey.1 
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